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Abstract— Critical infrastructures encompass various sectors, 
such as energy resources and manufacturing, which tend to be 
dispersed over large geographic areas. With recent 
technological advancements over the last decade, they have 
developed to be dependent on Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT); where control systems and 
the use of sensor equipment facilitate operation. However, the 
persistently evolving global state of ICT has resulted in the 
emergence of sophisticated cyber-threats. As dependence upon 
critical infrastructure systems continues to increase, so too 
does the urgency with which these systems need to be 
adequately protected. Modelling and testbed development are 
now crucial for the study and analysis of security within 
critical infrastructures; particularly as testing within a live 
system can have far-reaching impacts, including potential loss 
of life. Existing testbed approaches are not replicable or 
involve the use of simulation, which impacts upon the realism 
of the datasets constructed. As such, the research presented in 
this paper discusses the novel development of a replicable and 
affordable critical infrastructure testbed for cyber-security 
training and research. The testbed can be used to anticipate 
cyber-security incidents and assist in the development of new 
and innovative cyber-security methods. The access to real-
world data for training, research and testing new design 
methodologies is a challenge for security researchers; as such, 
the aim of this project is to provide an original methodology 
for the construction of accessible data for cyber-security 
research. The testbed data is evaluated through a comparison 
with a simulation comprised of the same components. 
Keywords-critical infrastructure; cyber-security; modelling; 
testbed; data analysis; teaching. 
I.  INTRODUCTION (HEADING 1) 
Critical infrastructures are comprised of a network of 
interdependent man-made systems. They interoperate to 
provide a continuous flow of services, which are essential for 
economic development and social well-being. Food and 
water distribution, energy supply, finance, military defence, 
manufacturing, transport, governmental services and 
healthcare are all notable examples of services provided by 
critical infrastructures (Merabti et al.,). One of their key 
defining factors is society’s dependence on their amenities 
and the potential loss encountered if a successful physical or 
cyber-attack takes place. For example, Reichenbach et al., 
detail that public life within Germany would reach civil war 
levels if power supply breaks down; optimistic worst-case 
scenarios had this occurring within a 10-day period. This 
illustrates the emphasis placed on critical infrastructure 
safeguarding practices.  
All critical infrastructure areas are becoming substantial 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) users; 
making use of automation to facilitate production and 
expand their services. ICT has also increased in areas such as 
agriculture and water (Mafuta et al.,), where control systems 
and the use of sensor equipment increases the efficiency of 
production to satisfy growing demands. For example, the use 
of robotics in farming to assist with labour-intensive work is 
revolutionising the way in which crops are grown and 
maintained (Mafuta et al.,). However, the challenge of low-
power operation, means that almost no update, encryption or 
debugging capabilities are possible for the sensors in place. 
Infrastructure interdependencies have developed as ICT 
usage has increased. Many companies accept that IC 
systems' communication is not encrypted and try to hide 
them within internal networks. Many network protocols have 
now been replaced by normal TCP and HTTP. The challenge 
is, many systems that were not accessible before, are now 
within the public internet. In addition, a critical failure in one 
infrastructure can directly lead to disruptions in others, 
exacerbating the risks being faced. This increase in 
digitisation and interconnectivity has also meant that such 
failures could be deliberately implemented from a remote 
location by means of a cyber-attack. Furthermore, the 
increasing complexity of cyber-attacks and the open source 
availability of attack-toolkits mean that effective security 
within critical infrastructures is a challenging task. 
Developing future cyber-attack countermeasures requires 
real-world critical infrastructure data, which can be 
problematic. Real-world data is sensitive and often 
classified, thus companies are unwilling to part with it, even 
to aid researchers and students investigating cyber-security 
methods that may help safeguard their systems in the future.  
The novel Micro-CI project, featured in this paper, aims 
to address the lack of access to experimental data and the 
hands-on experience needed to properly understand the 
challenges involved in an era of growing digital threats. This 
is achieved through the design and construction of a 
replicable critical infrastructure testbed for cyber-security 
training and research. 
As such, the intended output of the project is to construct 
a bespoke ‘bench-top’ testbed for data generation; consisting 
of a model infrastructure system. The testbed is used for 
cyber-security research purposes and testing new 
experimental methods for enhancing the level of security in 
cyber-critical systems. The testbed consists of a hackable 
water distribution plant with control system and realistic 
infrastructure data output. This results in the creation of a 
safe and interactive environment, in which, theoretical cyber-
security systems can be tested.  
Software-based simulation data is often used to test 
theoretical cyber-security systems; however, data constructed 
through emulators is inherently lacking in realism and a 
hands-on learning experience is missed. A simulation is a 
representation of a mental model. This is an issue, as a tester 
would test the correctness of the mental model and not the 
real world application, which would have a negative impact. 
In addition, environmental concerns (e.g. temperature) might 
be a significant consideration during a test; typically, this is 
not a consideration during simulation design. Also, from an 
educational perspective, there are multiple modes of learning 
(e.g., aural, visual,) and there is a category of students that 
need physical hands-on experience to understand a concept. 
For that reason, in this paper, the architecture for the 
Micro-CI testbed, which replicates a water distribution plant, 
is outlined. Similarly, both the physical design and 
construction of the testbed is detailed. The Micro-CI testbed 
forms the basis of the novel contribution made by this paper. 
A case study and evaluation, in which cyber-attacks are 
launched against the water distribution plant, is also 
presented. For this, both the Micro-CI testbed and industry-
leading critical infrastructure simulation software are used to 
generate results, and compare the datasets produced. This 
then enables the assessment of the suitability of the data 
produced by the testbed for future cyber-security research 
and experimentation. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. 
Section 2 presents a background discussion on testbed and 
critical infrastructure modelling. Cyber-security and cyber-
threats are also highlighted. Section 3 presents the novel 
methodology used to construct the Micro-CI testbed, the 
software simulation control model and an example of the 
data constructed from the testbed and the simulation. Section 
4 focuses on a case study of the impact of an attack on both 
the simulated and physical infrastructures. The application 
offered in Section 4 is an example to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the methodology highlighted in Section 3. 
Section 5 presents a discussion of the experiment and case 
study results. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section 6 and 
future work is highlighted. 
II. TYPE STYLE AND FONTS 
Having a well-established critical infrastructure network is 
often considered a sign of civilised life. Nations can be 
mediated by the strength of their infrastructure network and 
the services provided to their citizens. Dependence on these 
infrastructures is also one of society’s greatest weaknesses. 
A disruption to a single critical infrastructure can result in 
debilitating consequences on the population, economy and 
government. Operating as part of a distributed system, 
failures within critical infrastructures have the potential to 
cascade rapidly. 
A. The Cyber-Threats 
As dependence on these critical infrastructures increases, it is 
important that the ability to avoid disasters is enhanced. 
However, cyber-crime is becoming an increasingly 
concerning problem, especially with the abundance of freely 
available hacking toolkits. The effects of a cyber-attack can 
have far-reaching consequences including the availability of 
other dependent critical infrastructure services and the 
economy.  
Most cyber-attacks are financially motivated, whether 
this is from offering the attack as a paid-for service, through 
selling stolen information, exploiting information captured 
from spear-phishing attacks or from ransom or extortion 
tactics. Understanding the strategies employed by cyber-
attackers is crucial to counteracting the threat posed. 
Typically, attackers’ strategies can be categorised into three 
different types, Reckless, Random and Opportunistic 
(Mitchell et al.,). A Reckless attacker performs attacks 
whenever there is an opportunity to inflict maximum 
disruption to the services provided. A Random attacker 
strikes arbitrarily, to avoid detection, with the intention to 
cripple the target system. An Opportunistic attacker exploits 
the ambient noise of a system, and only attacks when the 
system is weak and the probability of success is high.  
As mentioned previously, most attacks are financially 
motivated. The most common of which is paid-for 
Distributed Denial of Service attacks (DDoS). DDoS attacks 
can be used to incapacitate the host servers of a organisation 
and usually involve the use of illegal botnets (Poisel et al.,). 
Botnets are effectively a hidden and illegal cyber-army, 
which can span across the globe, without the controlling-user 
having to invest in their own hardware or own any physical 
components (Feily et al.,). The popularity of this attack can 
be attributed to the operator having a relatively high level of 
anonymity. The usual form of a DDoS attack involves 
overloading routers and intermediate links by sending them 
enormous volumes of network traffic (Feily et al.,). There are 
several different types of DDoS techniques, some of which 
include:  
• SYN Flood: Known as a Transmission Control Protocol 
Synchronised Flood (SYN Flood), the attack involves 
exploiting the TCP connection establishment process 
(Haris et al.,). Specifically, to establish a connection, a 
device sends and receives a SYN. The DDoS attack, in 
this case, functions by making the server unavailable and 
the SYN process is blocked. 
• Peer-to-peer: This type of attack normally involves 
forcing clients of significant peer-to-peer file sharing 
centres to connect to a victim after disconnecting from 
their own network. These attacks operate differently to a 
botnet and the bot computers are often controlled 
individually. 
• Permanent denial of service: Often DDoS attacks can be 
so severe that the target hardware needs replacement as a 
result. This is known as a permanent denial of service 
(PDoS), where backdoors are exploited and used to target 
device firmware which is replaced by the attackers’ own 
firmware. 
Spear-phishing is another common form of cyber-attack, 
which relies on human error and a lack of threat awareness to 
be successful. The aim is to trick victims into thinking an 
email-based scam is legitimate by ensuring the information 
inside is specific to that person or organisation. As a result of 
successful spear-phishing attacks, numerous military and 
private industry systems have been breached in recent years 
(McAfee et al.,). Each penetration is the direct result of lack 
of understanding about the nature of the attack, which leads 
to sensitive information being disclosed. Unfortunately, once 
attackers have gained an initial point of entry to the system, 
they can often freely move throughout most of the network. 
The consequences of a successful spear-phishing attack 
are made possible through the tactical goal of achieving a 
foothold on the targeted system. For that reason, attacks are 
usually accomplished by using shellcode, code injection and 
capture attacks to compromise a physical component. Within 
a critical infrastructure setting, after a target node is 
compromised, the adversary refocuses the attack and 
employs the use of forgery, data modification, 
greyhole/blackhole (packet drop) and replay attacks to 
compromise sensors and return incorrect readings or execute 
incorrect commands (forgery attacks). These techniques 
ensure maximum damage is caused through a foothold 
situation. The above mentioned attacks comprise part of the 
background discussion as they are the most common faced 
by critical infrastructures. As such, they are demonstrated in 
the case study presented in Section 4. 
B. A Cyber-Security Challenge 
The control systems currently used in critical infrastructures 
systems are understandably closed source and not publically 
available. However, such systems continue to be at risk from 
cyber-attacks; and the facilitation of essential cyber-security 
research remains inherently a challenge.  
Critical infrastructures tend to be civilian owned by 
majority. Commercial companies operate competitively with 
limited capital for spending on security. The result of this is 
that security can be put at a disadvantage. Different 
technologies may be used in separate infrastructures as 
owners are hesitant to share or co-operate with others. This is 
because information or strategy can be given away by the 
actions it takes to secure the infrastructure. Separate private 
ownership of infrastructures poses a challenge for access to 
real-world data for cyber-security research and teaching. It is 
this challenge that is at the core of the research put forward 
in this paper. 
One aspect, which all critical infrastructures adopt to 
secure their service provision despite their separate 
ownership, is a Defence in Depth (DiD) approach (Hitchins 
et al.,). DiD involves compartmentalising the system into 
various layers, each of which operates with different security 
technologies and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). This 
ensures that if an attacker penetrates one layer, they are not 
automatically able to access the next one (Mukherjee et al.,). 
DiD is most effective when layers are created that are 
independent of each other. These various levels of security 
would, for example, include Low levels, Medium levels and 
High levels. The Low levels would be accessible by general 
employees who require basic security clearance to the 
infrastructure to perform their tasks and have access to only a 
small amount of necessary data. Whereas, the High levels 
would only be accessible by management and system 
administrators as the contents would be of a more sensitive 
nature. 
Inside the DiD approach, IDSs have the role of detecting 
hostile activities within a network, and signalling alarms 
when attacks are identified (Nowak et al.,). There are 
multiple types of IDS that are widely used to enhance 
network security (Zhang et al.,) by providing real time 
identification of misuse or unauthorised use, whilst allowing 
the system to continue functioning. Two common types of 
IDSs used for the identification of intrusion attempts include 
anomaly detection and signature-based detection. Anomaly 
detection involves the detection of abnormal network 
activities. For example, such an anomaly may include a 
sudden increase in data flow to a certain part of the system, 
which is unexpected (Sekar et al.,). Signature-based 
detection is the use of a pattern to identify data that stands 
out as being an intrusion (Nowak et al.,). The pattern is based 
on the comparison of the attack with known attack 
signatures. Signature-based detection, however, is non-
adaptive and cannot detect zero-day attacks (which do not 
have a pre-existing signature), making it an ineffective 
technique when used by itself (Li et al.,). To cover for 
various forms of attack, critical infrastructures typically use a 
combination of multiple types of IDS to maximise 
infrastructure protection from the many threats that can 
originate from external network connections. 
The continued growth in scale and complexity of some 
critical infrastructure systems means that they are becoming 
increasingly enticing targets for cyber-attacks. One such 
example is healthcare critical infrastructure systems, which 
are expanding to accommodate the influx of eHealth 
monitoring systems spawned by smart devices and the 
Internet of Things (IoT) concept. Modern eHealth 
monitoring systems are comprised of two main infrastructure 
layers (Sawand et al.,). The first is the Physical Layer, which 
encompasses wireless body area networks (WBANs), smart 
health trackers, IoT sensors and physical equipment used by 
medical staff. The second is the Service Layer, which houses 
the cloud computing and storage facilities, and the 
applications, software and services offered to patients that 
utilise the data provided by the Physical Layer. 
The Physical Layer is composed of many heterogeneous 
and computationally limited devices (e.g. heart rate sensors, 
blood oxygen sensors and blood sugar monitors), which pose 
many security and privacy challenges. For example, wireless 
communications make sensor technologies internet-
accessible, which leaves them publically exposed and highly 
vulnerable (Hill et al.). 
This exposure can be used to an attacker’s advantage by 
disseminating specific attacks to the patient-side that target 
both hardware and software. Attacks on medical critical 
infrastructure systems are increasing, with attackers aiming 
to cause maximum damage. This is exacerbated by the 
increasing number of attack vectors, such as over-the-air 
software update mechanisms, limited security/encryption 
capabilities, exploitable developer API exploitation and open 
source software exploitation. As an example, in over-the-air 
software update attacks, if updates are frequent, attackers can 
configure a radio to the appropriate frequency and with a 
demodulation technique, record updates, reverse engineer the 
format, craft a software containing malware and deliver it to 
the targeted device. Additionally, in source code analysis 
(through Open Source software or disassembled and 
decompiled binaries), stack buffer overflow vulnerabilities 
can be revealed. The attacker can also use fuzzing to execute 
stack buffer overflow attacks. 
C. Current Critical Infrastructure Testbeds 
Cyber-security research is hampered by a lack of realistic 
experimental data and opportunities to test new theories in a 
real-world environment (Benzel et al.,). Ordinarily, the 
production of reliable and accurate research results would 
require the purchase of critical infrastructure hardware, 
which is extremely expensive and impractical. This has led 
to the development of specific software-based simulators, 
such as Technomatix (Stoll et al.,) and NS3 (Aalamifar et 
al.,)]; and the adaptation of existing software-based 
simulators such as OMNET++ (Queiroz et al.,), Simulink 
and Matlab (Ficco et al.,). These software simulators enable 
affordable representations of critical infrastructure systems, 
by modelling their behaviour, interactions and the integration 
of their specific protocols (e.g. MODBUS).  
However, the suitability of simulation has long been 
disputed; with the argument that simulations do not represent 
real-world scenarios accurately, as they lack the ability to 
model the interactions of control system components. As 
such, this project aims to provide a testbed that is 
rudimentary and low-cost to build, but remains extensible. 
The practical nature of the testbed aims to provide users with 
a greater level of realism, and a more accurate representation 
of how different events and behaviours would manifest 
themselves in real-world scenarios. 
As critical infrastructure testbed development for security 
research is an active yet relatively infantile subject area, 
there are several similar, yet limited, existing research 
projects. Some of them are outlined as follows. SCADA 
LAB (Aragó et al.) is an EU funded project to build a critical 
infrastructure testbed with a conjoined security lab, to 
facilitate security experiments. However, the primary 
limitation of this system is that it is a remote access system, 
with both the configuration and experimentation carried out 
by a third party. The testbed proposed in the paper is 
localised, where researchers/students are able to oversee and 
manage all aspects of their experiments directly. This means 
it is more tangible and users can more readily relate directly 
with their experimentations.  
As the implementation of a working critical infrastructure 
testbed can be time-consuming, Farooqui et al., propose a 
hybrid approach by combining physical commercial 
hardware and simulation software. However, our project 
consists of the implementation of working control devices, 
rather than relying on simulation software. Additionally, the 
testbed utilises small-scale, and therefore portable, hardware; 
rather than rigid commercial hardware. 
Benzel et al., discuss the use of DETER, a cyber-
DEfense Technology Experimental Research testbed for 
supporting the development of next-generation security 
technologies and experimentation. The testbed is deigned to 
bridge the gap between small-scale and Internet-scale 
experiments, through combing both software and hardware 
components. The testbed also offers tools that aid the 
experimenters. The main drawback of the DETER testbed is 
that it is not sufficiently replicable or portable. Meaning 
users are unable to create their own and its operation relies 
on connecting to the DETER host. 
In addition to the aforementioned testbed approaches, 
there are several existing proposals for critical infrastructure 
testbed architectures, which focus on specific systems, such 
as electricity substations (Wei et al.,). However, our long-
term goal is not to constrain our testbed to a single role, but 
to adopt a modular approach; whereby new critical 
infrastructure roles can be integrated at a later stage. This 
would make it suitable and useful to a wider audience. 
Specifically, the proposed system focuses on a water 
distribution plant; however, the design is extendable and 
testbeds can be extended to incorporate other infrastructure 
types, such as an ecologically-aware power plant. 
A framework has also been proposed to address the 
problem of simulating large-scale critical infrastructure 
systems on a localised testbed by Ficco et al. As such, they 
present a framework, which acts as a glue layer between a 
distributed testbed and simulation of components. The 
drawback of such an approach is the use of a hybrid method 
to combine both simulation and physical systems. This 
results in a testbed which is not rudimentary and where 
simulation impacts the quality of data produced. Within the 
MicroCI project, we are primarily concerned with the 
practical realism of the data and reliability of the generated 
results through a real-world implementation. 
The testbed proposed in by Morris et al., is the most 
similar existing research to ours in terms of its design, and 
pedagogical and research purposes (Morris et al.,). The 
research put forwards proposes a testbed that focuses on 
cyber-security and utilises miniature hardware for a realistic 
representation of critical infrastructures. However, the 
project is only available locally at the authors’ institution and 
is not easily replicable or portable.  
A defining factor of the MicroCI project is to develop a 
testbed, which is cost effective and easily replicable by other 
institutions. The design and implementation will both be 
detailed in publications and made accessible during the 
project dissemination process. 
III.  METHODOLOGY & IMPLEMENTATION 
Currently, model critical infrastructure testbeds are sparse in 
the UK. This project provides research opportunities for the 
testing and development of security enhancements in a real-
life scenario. As such, the aim of the research is to have a 
practical output; a fully working critical infrastructure 
testbed. The goal is to demonstrate that the datasets 
generated by the Micro-CI testbed, are of comparable 
suitability to those created by industry-standard software. In 
this section, an outline of the architecture of the Micro-CI 
project is presented. This includes an explanation of how the 
architecture is identically replicated using both the physical 
Micro-CI hardware and the industry-standard simulation 
software. 
A. Testbed Architectural Overview 
The design displayed below in Figure 1 presents a water 
distribution plant. The specification is modest, meaning there 
is scope for future expansion; yet is sufficient in size to 
produce realistic infrastructure behaviour datasets for 
research purposes. As illustrated in the diagram, there are 
two reservoir tanks, which are fed by two pumps moving 
water from external sources. 
 
Figure 1. Water distribution plant testbed architecture 
The remote terminal unit (RTU) is used to monitor the 
outgoing flow rate and water level, to dynamically adjust 
the pump speed ensuring adequate replenishment of the 
reservoir tanks. However, vulnerabilities exist in the system, 
meaning that it is possible for an attacker to cut off the 
water supply or flood the reservoir tanks. The design is 
extendable to other applications, in that it can be connected 
to other critical infrastructure models (such as power plants, 
telecommunications etc.), if additional equipment is to be 
included. This would facilitate future research projects 
investigating the effect of cascading failures throughout a 
network of inter-connected critical infrastructures.  
B. Practical Micro-CI implementation and data 
generation 
To replicate the architecture illustrated in Figure 1, we will 
be constructing the physical Micro-CI testbed in accordance 
with the wiring schematics shown in Figure 2. Specifically, 
the physical components required include: an Arduino Uno 
Rev. 3 as the RTU, two 12v peristaltic pumps as the water 
pumps, two liquid flow meters, two water level sensors, two 
amplification transistors, diodes, resistors and an LCD.  
 
Figure 2. Physical wiring schematics 
In the schematics shown in Figure 2, potentiometer 
symbols have been used in place of the four sensors; this is 
due to the limited symbols available in the modelling 
software. The fifth, unlabelled, potentiometer is used to 
control the brightness of the LCD. As the maximum output 
of the Arduino is only 5v, transistors amplify this to the 12v 
required by the pumps. Lastly, the diodes are used to ensure 
the current can only travel in one direction, thus preventing 
damage to the Arduino. The hardware specification used is 
modest, meaning there is scope for future expansion; yet is 
sufficient in size to produce realistic infrastructure 
behaviour datasets for research purposes. 
 
Figure 3. Example Serial Data Stream 
For the purpose of this experiment, the Arduino board 
remains connected to a PC via a USB cable (although this 
could be replaced with a network connection for similar 
experiments). Through this USB connection, a serial 
connection is established to supply a real-time data feed, 
which is recorded and preserved by the PC (as illustrated in 
Figure 3). The metrics collected in this instance include: 
Water level sensor1/2 readings, Flow meter1/2 readings and 
Pump1/2 speeds. These readings are taken from each sensor 
every 0.25 seconds (4Hz) and written to the serial data 
stream.  
To examine the quality of the data produced by the 
Micro-CI implementation, a dataset was recorded over the 
period of 1 hour. During this time, the testbed was operating 
under normal parameters (i.e. no cyber-attacks were present). 
Essentially, this means that the pump speeds are configured 
to slowly continue filling the tanks at a controlled speed until 
full (even if no water is being used) and to cover the current 
rate of water consumption (if possible). The outflow (water 
being consumed) is a randomly applied value within a 
specific range (to make usage patterns more realistic). In this 
instance, the water source pipe is 60% smaller than the 
outflow pipe, which allows for a more accurate 
representation (and to simulate overflow). 
Table 1 – Physical testbed Data Sample (%)* 
Sample (t) P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 
00:10.5 65.0 69.9 47.3 55.4 81.9 85.1 
00:10.7 65.0 69.9 39.4 48.5 74.1 78.8 
00:11.0 65.0 69.9 39.4 53.4 74.1 83.1 
00:11.2 65.0 69.9 33.6 50.5 69.0 81.1 
00:11.5 65.0 69.9 41.4 39.7 76.0 70.2 
*Symbol explanations are given in the Appendix 
C. Software simulation model implementation and data 
generation 
The simulation is constructed, in accordance with the 
architecture shown in Figure 1. The software is based on 
object-oriented modelling, where each component inserted 
is an individual object, which can be adjusted and used to 
construct data. The resulting simulation environment is 
displayed in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4 – Case Study Simulation Testbed 
The figure depicts a graphical overview of the emulation, 
including a water source, two pumps, two tanks and 
network of pipes used to deliver the water throughout the 
system. Sensors are coded to extract data at a sampling rate 
of 0.25 seconds (4Hz) from each of the components within 
the system. The flow of water from the source to the tanks is 
governed by the two pumps, and the speed can be adjusted 
as required. During simulation run-time, the behaviour of 
one simulation component has a direct impact on another. 
When a component failure occurs, the simulation is able to 
keep functioning, but the effects of the fault should be 
visible in the dataset. The system functions smoothly and 
consistently. However, the output and behaviour differs 
slightly every time the system operates resulting in variance 
in the datasets.  
As previously mentioned, it is clear the use of simulation 
has many benefits in critical infrastructure protection 
planning. The advantage of using simulation is that 
conducting experimentation can be done on a realistic 
representation of a system without the worry that any 
damage done would have a real impact. It is this aspect that 
is transferred over the physical testbed. However, the 
drawback of simulation is in the quality of data produced. 
As such, in the following subsection, data constructed from 
the simulation and the physical testbed are presented and 
compared in a case study put forward in Section 4. 
The water distribution infrastructure in the simulation 
consists of 12 components. To provide a benchmark to 
compare the Micro-CI data against, the simulation data was 
again captured over the period of 1 hour of simulation, with 
the system functioning under normal conditions. Appendix 
(1) clarifies the selected components presented in the table. 
The numbers in Table 2 represent the percentage of the 
water level in the corresponding component or the 
operational speed of the component. For example, at 00:10.5 
component C1 is 85.7% full, whereas C2 is empty. Each of 
the components within the simulated system are started with 
the initial configuration of 0 % full. This is because, unlike 
the Micro-CI testbed, it is a challenge to begin a simulation 
with the tanks partially filled. The tank water level is 
calculated based upon the units of water, which flow into 
and out of the component. 
Table 2 – Simulation Data Sample (%)* 
Sample (t) C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 
00:10.5 85.7 0 0 100 100 83.3 
00:10.7 100 100 100 100 100 100 
00:11.0 100 100 100 100 100 100 
00:11.2 100 100 100 100 100 100 
00:11.5 100 100 100 100 100 100 
*Symbol explanations are given in the Appendix 
There is no significant change in the data during the one 
second sample presented above. This demonstrates that the 
water flow is consistent within each of the components at 
the given point in time. 
IV. 4. CASE STUDY 
In this section, a case study is presented, which involves 
conducting known cyber-attack types on both the Micro-CI 
testbed and the simulation. The quality of the data produced 
is assessed and a discussion is put forward on the suitability 
of both data types for cyber-security research. 
In the scenario of this case study, the end users’ water is 
supplied by a remote water distribution plant. The control of 
this plant is governed by an RTU, which is under a DDoS 
attack. The attack degraded the stability of the 
communication links between the RTU and its sensors. This 
in turn means that the availability and frequency of the 
sensor value measurements is degraded.  
A.  Simulation Data Preparation 
In the simulation, each of the components has a random 
failure implemented and a specified time to repair. This 
enables the introduction of a level of realism within the 
dataset constructed. However, the system should not stop 
functioning if one of the minor components has a fault. As 
such, threat behaviour is constructed by causing targeted and 
random disruptions to the system by increasing the 
availability percentage in specific components. Turning 
components off and on, during the simulation, causes a 
knock-on effect throughout the rest of the system. To 
construct our abnormal dataset, the availability percentage 
was increased in each of the components, whilst ensuring the 
system was able to continue functioning. The Availability 
Percentage refers to the chances of a machine or component 
being ready to use at any given time taking into account 




Here, A is the unavailability of the component, M is the 
Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) and F is the Mean Time 
Between Failures (MTBF). The implementation of random 
failures is intended to reflect realistic unexpected 
component malfunctions, which occur in all infrastructures. 
However, due to the fact that power plant systems are 
designed to be enduring, the failure percentage in the system 
components was kept low. 
When constructing the anomalous behaviour dataset, this 
approach facilitates impacting system behaviour and, 
subsequently, the data produced. By implementing more 
extensive system failures, orchestrated attacks can be 
conducted on the simulation in order to construct a data set, 
which would be similar to that of a cyber-attack taking 
place. In order to generate attack behaviour, a number of 
recognised faults are introduced to the system. This 
facilitates an understanding of the system operating whilst 
under the effects of a cyber-attack. 
(a)  (b) 
Figure 5 – Simulation Normal Data Plot(a) vs Cyber-Attack Data Plot (b) 
These faults are introduced to the system over a period of 
two hours, to create a balanced dataset for normal and attack 
behaviour. Figure 5 displays box plots of the simulation data 
for normal behaviour and when in a cyber-attack scenario. 
The components are displayed along the x-axis, with labels 
1 to 6. The y-axis displays the level of water within the 
component. The change in behaviour, as a result of the 
attack, can be seen in the average value changes in the 
datasets, and is clearer in some components, such as C1 and 
C4. The change in behaviour is not visually apparent in 
others. Changes in behaviour as a result of an attack taking 
place can often be subtle and hard to identify, particularly 
when individual components within a vast system are 
targeted. 
B.  Testbed Data Preparation 
For the first part of this case study, data for the water 
distribution plant is recorded whilst operating under normal 
conditions. This allows for the building of a behavioural 
norm profile for the system, in order to identify anomalies. 
Within the testbed, during the DDoS attack, only 
intermittent readings from the sensors are received, forcing 
it to make drastic (and therefore uncharacteristic) changes to 
the pump speeds, rather than gradual as when operating as 
normal. 
In this cyber-attack dataset, a DDoS attack is launched 
against the RTU’s communications channel, so it is only 
able to get sensor readings intermittently. Whilst no new 
values are readily available, the RTU will continue to 
maintain the previous pump speed. 
(a) (b) 
Figure 6 – Testbed Normal Data Plot (a) vs Cyber-Attack Data Plot (b) 
Again, the components are displayed along the x-axis, 
with labels 1 to 6. The y-axis displays the operating capacity 
of the component. The exact behaviour induced by this 
experiment was relatively unknown. The results obtained 
showed that one tank kept filling whilst the other 
maintained the same level. Figure 6 displays box plots of 
the testbed data for normal behaviour and when in a cyber-
attack scenario. The change in behaviour, as a result of the 
attack, can be seen in the average value changes in the 
datasets, as previously for the simulation dataset. 
Particularly a change in the output for P5 is visually 
apparent.  
The data constructed during normal operation and under 
cyber-attack is used to assess the potential of the data to be 
used for cyber-security training and research. The data is 
evaluated using data classification techniques to identify the 
nature and timing of the conducted cyber-attacks. The 
quality of the results produced by the testbed is compared 
with the data constructed through simulation. 
C. Data Pre-Processing 
Before data classification is performed, the data requires 
pre-processing. One of the main issues with the dataset 
generated by the simulation is the level of noise in the data. 
In order to achieve the highest possible results in the 
classification process, the noise needs to be reduced. This is 
achieved by editing or removing values from the dataset 
which are unwanted by the classifiers but constitute parts of 
the dataset which are of interest. 
As a result of the behaviour of specific components in 
the system, there is a high level of zeros in the simulation 
dataset. The zeros are a result of either component failing 
due to introduced errors, or units of liquid in the system 
passing through a component faster than the sampling rate. 
Zeros, therefore, represent aspects such as pipes functioning 
normally. If the samples are consistently above zero for 
components, such as the water pipes, it would be the result 
of failures in the system. For that reason, the zero values are 
retained in our data set. 
Data pre-processing and feature extraction are essential 
stages, and affect the data classification results. The features 
selected represent characteristics of system behaviour (Xu et 
al.,). The process of feature selection effectively minimises 
the dataset and presents a representation of the behaviour 
taking place in the data to the classifier. Primarily, the goal 
of the feature selection process has three clear benefits 
including data comprehension, increased efficiency and 
prediction performance. 
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P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 4Hz Every Minute 1 Day 
• Data Comprehension: Extracting features from a data set 
allows for a better comprehension of what the data is 
representing. 
• Efficiency: Reducing the amount of data being classified 
allows for faster processing, reducing time of learning 
and reducing memory use. 
• Prediction: The performance of the classifiers is also 
improved through effective feature selection. Factors 
such as noise reduction and the elimination of irrelevant 
data enable the classifiers to be efficiently trained. 
• The data manipulation process is the construction of 
feature vectors from significantly large normal and 
abnormal data sets. For this initial case study, the 
components themselves comprise the features, with the 
variables extracted every minute or 240 rows in the raw 
data. The data analysis is presented in the following 
subsection. 
D. Data Analysis 
In this section, data classification techniques are employed 
to assess the effectiveness of the data produced by the 
testbed for research purposed. Neural network classifiers are 
selected to assess the quality of the data produced. Previous 
research has used neural networks to successfully measure 
data quality (Tchorbadjieff et al.,). Hence, we will be using 
neural networks as a bench mark to assess the quality of the 
data produced, a comparison and discussion on the datasets 
is put forward. 
In order to perform the classification of the data, a 
selection of classifiers where used, these include: back-
propagation trained feed-forward neural network classifier 
(BPXNC), levenberg-marquardt trained feed-forward neural 
network classifier (LMNC), automatic neural network 
classifier (NEURC), trainable linear perceptron classifier 
(PERLC), voted perception classifier (VPC) and the random 
neural network classifier (RNNC) (Hyong et al.,). The 
classification experiments are run 30 times on the datasets. 
The reason the classification experiments are conducted 30 
times is to account for errors and to give consistency. 
Statisticians identify that experiments conducted 30 times 
provide an adequate realistic average (Salkind et al.,). 
In order to calculate the results, firstly, a Confusion 
Matrix determines the distribution of errors across all 
classes (Marom et al.,). The estimate of the classifier is 
calculated as the trace of the matrix divided by the total 
number of entries. Additionally, a Confusion Matrix 
highlights where misclassification occurs in experiment. In 
other words, it shows true positive (a), false positive (c), 
true negative (d) and false negative (b) values. Diagonal 
elements show the performance of the classifier, while off 
diagonal presents errors. This is displayed in Table 4. 
Table 4 – Confusion Matrix 
 + - 
+ a b 
- c d 
The results are calculated mathematically, using the 
following formulae, where a refers to True Positive, d 
implies True Negative and b and c refer to False Positive 
and False Negative respectively. N is the total number of 







Tables 5 and 6 present the results of the classification 
process and include the success of the classification or Area 
under the Curve (AUC), sensitivity, specificity and error. 
Where specificity refers to normal system behaviour, 
sensitivity refers to abnormal (or attack behaviour) and 
accuracy represents the success of the classification. Each of 
the results are calculated using the above formulae. 
Table 5 – Simulation Classification Results 
Classifiers AUC Sensitivity Specificity Error 
VPC 0.050 0.500 0.000 0.500 
RNNC 0.850 0.769 1.000 0.150 
PERLC 0.750 0.667 1.000 0.250 
BPXNC 0.767 0.682 1.000 0.233 
LMNC 0.833 0.750 1.000 0.167 
NEURC 0.867 0.789 1.000 0.133 
It is clear from the results in both tables, that the 
classifiers are able to detect accurately both the normal and 
abnormal behaviours in the data set. A discussion and 
comparison of the results is subsequently presented in the 
following section. 
Table 6 – Testbed Classification Results 
Classifiers AUC (%) Sensitivity Specificity Error 
VPC 0.733 0.652 1.000 0.267 
RNNC 0.850 0.818 0.889 0.150 
PERLC 0.800 0.875 0.750 0.200 
BPXNC 0.983 1.000 0.968 0.017 
LMNC 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.033 
NEURC 0.933 0.933 0.933 0.063 
V. EVALUATION 
Within the simulation classification results, the NEURC 
classifier is the most accurate; able to classify 86.7% of the 
data correctly with an error of 0.133. For the NEURC 
classifier 28 out of 30 normal behaviours are correctly 
classified. During the physical testbed classification process 
LMNC is to identify 99.67% of the behaviours accurately, 
with an error of 0.0667. In the following subsection, a 
discussion is put forward on the significance of the results 
obtained. 
A. Results Comparison 
Figure 7 displays a comparison of the results achieved from 
the neural network classification. The graphs depict that the 
classifiers are able to more successfully identify threat 
behaviours using the Micro-CI testbed, rather than through a 
simulation approach. This is particularly the case for the 
sensitivity, AUC and error. In addition to the difference 
between the AUC results produced by the neural network 
classification, the specificity results, in particular, hold 
significance for the evaluation of the datasets. 
 
Figure 7 – Simulation Results vs Testbed Results 
A comparison between the specificity results (normal 
behaviours) show that the simulation approach results in 5/6 
classifiers being able to identify 100% of normal behaviour; 
with most of the misclassification occurring for the 
sensitivity (the identification of abnormal/attack behaviour). 
Within the simulation approach, normal system behaviour is 
straightforward to identify, as the simulation behaviour 
doesn’t have significant changes in its operation and 
performs as coded to perform. In a ‘real-life’ environment, 
the physical system is set up to behave in a specific way but 
always functions slightly differently to the anticipated. This 
means that any research conducted using simulation to 
construct data is hampered by over classification for the 
specificity/normal behaviour dataset. 
B. Testbed Attacks Comparison 
As previously discussed, one of the aims of this project is to 
devise a testbed, which is suitable for cyber-security training 
and research. As demonstrated in the previous subsection, it 
is our belief that the use of real-life data is more suitable for 
cyber-security research, than that of simulation. The second 
part of the case study involves a demonstration of the two 
further datasets constructed through launching the following 
cyber-attacks on the Micro-CI testbed:  
• Signal injection: Falsified malicious data is injected, 
masquerading as one of the flow sensors. This forces the 
RTU to change the pumps’ settings to suit the malicious 
data. Specifically, a signal injection attack is launched 
against the water flow sensor on tank 2, in which we tell 
it there is no water leaving tank2. The water level drops, 
however, it drops slowly as the tank is still on a slow 
refill (as it is not full). 
• DoS: One of the water level sensors is rendered 
completely inaccessible to the RTU by means of a DoS 
attack. This causes the RTU to labour to accurately 
control the pumping station, as the crucial data needed is 
unavailable. Specifically, a DoS attack was launched 
against the water level sensor in tank1, meaning the 
RTU is getting a result of 0, which misleads it into 
thinking the tank is empty, so the tank fills up much 
quicker. 
• As such, Figure 8 below displays the resulting data 
output of the Micro-CI testbed pump speeds, during 
normal operation and when subjected to the three attacks 
discussed in this paper. Each of the experiments was 
conducted on an identical testbed. 
 
Figure 8 – Simulation Attack Data Visualisation 
The graphs display a clear change in behaviour as a 
result of the attacks taking place. The majority of the attacks 
are targeted at pump 2, where the separation of the datasets 
can be clearly identified. This is a demonstration of realistic 
data construction though use of the testbed. The RTU 
inclusion means that Micro-CI users have remote access to 
the functioning components. Different attack types produce 
diverse dataset outputs. 
C. Physical Testbed Benefits 
As a whole, modern education and research is becoming 
increasingly reliant on virtualised labs and tools (Topham et 
al.,). Despite the numerous benefits they offer, there are 
many inherent limitations. Therefore, any learning or 
research undertaken using these tools is based around the 
limitations and characteristics of such tools, as well as any 
assumptions made by their developers. Additionally, the 
accuracy of data resulting from such simulations and models 
may be further decreased if used outside of their intended 
usage scenario. For example, in network reconnaissance, a 
Christmas tree packet (a packet set with an unusual 
combination of TCP headers), can cause different operating 
systems to respond in different ways (differing from defined 
IP standards). The disparity amongst these responses can be 
used to identify the underlying operating system. These 
types of unusual quirks can be utilised by attackers, and are 
often not something that is covered by simulation software. 
The practical element involved in the Micro-CI project 
introduces a level of realism that is difficult to match 
through simulation. 
A recent report (Lewis et al.,) examined the usage of 
both physical and virtual tools and labs. The report 
concluded that a virtual-based approach offers significant 
cost savings and a self-paced and active approach to 
learning. However, it also highlighted that it has several key 
limitations including: no hands-on experience, no real-world 
training with specific equipment and no experience in 
identifying and interpreting incorrect or uncharacteristic 
data.  
The findings of this report echo our concerns that 
simulation is very effective at representing “correct” 
behaviour. However, critical infrastructure systems need to 
be protected against situations where they are exposed to 
extreme abnormal events. Unfortunately, in such 
circumstances, systems will not always behave in the way 
expected, fail gracefully or consistently respond in the same 
manner. Similarly, it is therefore difficult to accurately 
model how a system’s erratic behaviour might affect other 
parts of the infrastructure. This is why we firmly believe 
that adopting Micro-CI’s unique approach would provide an 
ideal solution, as it allows for the advantages of both 
physical and virtual tools to be combined, some of which 
are discussed below. 
• Pedagogical benefits: The Micro-CI approach offers 
students and researchers with hands-on experience and 
first-hand knowledge of the unpredictability of a system 
under attack or stress. It will also help them to refine 
their problem solving and practical skills. 
• Cost effectiveness: The Micro-CI project has been 
designed to be as cost effective as possible. For example, 
at the time of writing, we estimate that at current prices, 
the design presented in this paper can be replicated for 
around £100. 
• Portability: As the project components are on a 
miniaturised bench top scale, it enables them to be 
packed away, stored and transported with ease. In most 
cases, projects can still be moved and/or stored whilst 
partially assembled. 
• Platform independency: The Micro-CI project does not 
require any specific requirements, dependencies or 
operating systems to interact with the testbeds 
developed. Additionally, it is not tied or restricted by 
any licencing model, so it can be used on an infinite 
number of different machines, without incurring 
additional costs. 
As with all solutions, there are some drawbacks to our 
approach. The first is that the use of low cost hardware 
reduces the level of accuracy that can be achieved. For 
example, the Arduino Uno uses an ATMega 
microcontroller, which is only capable of recording 4-byte 
precision in double values (Lewis et al.,). This can present 
problems if precision is a crucial part of the research being 
undertaken. However, this can be mitigated by purchasing 
more expensive hardware. Another, limitation is that in 
comparison to simulation software, the practical approach 
may require a greater level of improvement to students’ 
skillsets (which is not a detrimental attribute), and a longer 
initial construction time, to accomplish a working 
implementation. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
One of the main challenges for governments around the 
globe is the need to improve the level of awareness for 
citizens and businesses about the threats that exist in 
cyberspace. The arrival of new information technologies has 
resulted in different types of criminal activities, which 
previously did not exist, with the potential to cause 
extensive damage to internal markets. 
Given the fact that the Internet is boundary-less, it makes it 
difficult to identify where attacks originate from and how to 
counter them. Improving the level of support for security 
systems helps with the evolution of defences against cyber-
attacks. This project supports the development of critical 
infrastructure security research, in the fight against a 
growing threat from the digital domain.  
The research project will further knowledge and 
understanding of information systems; specifically acting as 
a facilitator for cyber-security research. In our future work, 
we will publish the constructed testbed and make the 
datasets available for cyber-security and critical 
infrastructure research. In addition, we propose to add 2-3 
cheap CHIPs/ Raspberry Pi’s to the testbed. In a real-world 
scenario, ICS systems are continually connected to a 
computing infrastructure. Therefore, with the addition of the 
PIs the following would be possible.  
• Denote a Pi as the ‘Coorporation Firewall’. Behind the 
Firewall, there would be two systems: the existing ICS 
as well as another Pi, referred to as the ‘office 
computer’. External to the firewall, there should be 
another computer called ‘Target’. All three of these 
could be implemented using CHIPs. The additional cost 
of this implementation would be minimal (around £15 
together).  
This additional equipment would then enable further 
attack scenarios, such as: 
• The office computer periodically surfs to the external 
‘target’. Now the attacker could place a payload on the 
external computer. This would emulate a waterhole 
attack, which is quite common for spear phishing. With 
that, it would be possible to connect a mentioned threat 
to the test lab. 
• As ICS are often part of a botnet, with this setup it 
would then also be possible to measure outgoing traffic 
from the ICS to the external computer. That would make 
the DoS scenario increasingly realistic. 
• Pivoting, i.e., lateral movement after the initial breach 
would also be testable with this setup. 
This future implementation would move the testbed 
from pure IC testbed to IC within a company setup testbed. 
Such a testbed would be invaluable for education. In 
addition, the forthcoming work will involve making the 
construction design and instructions available to other 
researchers and students. 
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VII. APPENDIX 
Table 7 A.1 – Simulation Components 







Table 8 A.2 – Micro-CI Testbed Components 
Abbreviation Physical Component Description  
P1 Water Level 1 
P2 Water Level 2 
P3 Water Flow 1 
P4 Water Flow 2 
P5 Pump Speed 1 
P6 Pump Speed 2 
 
 
 
 
